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Structured Abstract  
 
Purpose – This paper aims to develop a conceptual framework of an integrated knowledge 
management system, in which several knowledge management strategies are nested. 
Specifically, the paper focuses on possible strategies to localise and transfer different types 
of knowledge resources in project-based organisations, including expertise embedded in 
talented people, in order to pursue new emerging business opportunities and improve the 
whole organisation’s effectiveness.  
 
Design/methodology/approach – This paper is theoretical in nature. Drawing on the 
literature on the management of tacit knowledge in project-based organisations and on 
internal knowledge markets we introduce the conceptual framework for an internal 
knowledge market which may suit the context of project-based organisations. We also 
briefly discuss some organisational and managerial issues potentially connected to internal 
knowledge market development. 
 
Originality/value – The originality of the paper lies in assuming different motivational 
drivers, currencies and market structures for the different kinds of knowledge goods that 
can be exchanged in a complex organisational structure, such as a large project-based 
organisation. By focussing on the internal trade of knowledge-intensive human resources, 
i.e. a strategic knowledge good for project-based organisations, we aim to address a specific 
gap in the management literature. In fact, the literature, while recognising that managing 
knowledge-intensive resources is a critical issue in project-based organisations, largely 
neglects the market-based approach to deal with it. 
 
Practical implications – Although this paper is theoretical in nature, it provides some 
guidelines for the development of internal markets for knowledge intensive resources, 
defining contexts of application, roles of the different actors, working mechanisms as well 
as organizational and managerial tools to mitigate possible risks and enhance benefits. 
 
Keywords – Knowledge management, internal knowledge market, personalisation 
strategy, project-based organizations 
 
Paper type – Academic Research Paper  
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Recently, project based organisations (PBOs) have received increasing attention as an 
emerging organisational form, in which projects tend to become the primary business 
mechanism for coordinating all the main business functions of the firm. Several authors 
recognize PBO effectiveness as coping well with the emerging properties of extremely 
complex products and systems by responding to client needs in real time due to their 
flexibility and focus. Nevertheless, they point out peculiar knowledge management (KM) 
and organizational learning issues (Pemsel et al., 2016; Whitley, 2006; Lundin et al., 2015) 
as well as strategic misalignment in PBO. In fact, it is generally recognised that PBOs 
struggle to integrate knowledge and structures when projects are viewed as ‘‘singular 
ventures’’ (Grabher, 2004) and that, taken individually, these typically do not reflect the 
organisation’s strategic intent (Thiry and Deguire, 2007). 
Specifically, in these contexts, it seems that locating internal knowledge on a specialised 
topic and pursuing a centralised policy of knowledge resource (i.e. human experts) 
allocation, aimed at seizing emerging opportunities, is becoming a significant challenge. 
The larger and more segmented the company, the harder it is to find who knows what inside 
the organisation and to match its people to its problems (Benbya and van Alstyne, 2011). 
PBO form is more effective than functional form in integrating different types of 
knowledge, skill and learning within the project boundary, but it fails in finding the best 
knowledge resource allocation at the level of organization as a whole, with the consequent 
risk of losing development and growth opportunities. In order to discuss possible KM 
strategies used to face PBO weaknesses, particularly the problem of internal knowledge 
locating, mobilizing and integrating, we must first clarify what kind of knowledge resources 
are most relevant for PBOs. According to several scholars in most PBOs, a sustainable 
competitive advantage requires resources that are knowledge-based and intangible 
(Whitehill, 1997; Nonaka et al., 2000; Jugdev and Mathur, 2012). The implication is that 
PBOs must allow knowledge to remain tacit (Prencipe and Tell, 2001) and adopt a 
personalisation strategy (Hansen et al., 1999). In fact, in firms where “knowledge is closely 
tied to the person who developed it and is shared mainly through direct person-to-person 
contact” (Hansen et al., 1999, p. 107), personalisation strategy works best. This implies that 
effective dissemination of tacit knowledge within a PBO is largely reliant on human 
resource management and on the process of embedding employee knowledge within a 
firm’s generally accepted ways of operating or its organisational culture (Blackler, 1995; 
Müller, 1996; Swart and Kinnie, 2003; Tsoukas and Vladimirou, 2001).  
This paper aims to develop a conceptual framework of an integrated knowledge 
management system (KMS), in which several KM strategies are nested. Specifically, the 
paper focuses on possible strategies to localise and transfer different types of knowledge 
resources in PBOs, including expertise embedded in talented people, in order to pursue new 
emerging business opportunities and improve the whole organisation’s effectiveness.  
2 Theoretical Background  
2.1 KM in PBOs 
A PBO performs most of its activities, including product development, customer deliveries, 
and change efforts, as projects (Söderlund, 2005; Söderlund and Tell, 2011). According to 
several scholars (DeFillippi and Arthur, 1998; Jugdev and Mathur, 2012), tacit knowledge 
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resources embedded in human capital are the main source of competitive advantage in 
PBOs. Thus, the most convenient organisational strategy that can be used to manage these 
knowledge resources is personalisation (Hansen et al., 1999; Venkitachalam and Willmott, 
2015). The literature recognises that PBO’s main strength, which lies in effectively coping 
with project risks and uncertainties and responding quickly to changing client needs, can 
also work against the wider interest of corporate strategy (Hobday, 2000; Thiry and 
Deguire, 2007). Furthermore, according to several scholars (Dubois and Gadde, 2002; 
Lindkvist, 2004; Whitley, 2006), the salient features of PBOs are such that the organisation 
tends to be loosely coupled and characterised by poor cooperation across units and 
suboptimal resource usage. This implies difficulties in defining and implementing a 
corporate strategy to manage knowledge intensive resources, which are strictly connected 
to a human resource area of expertise, in order to allow better internal resource allocation 
and pursue the interests at both project and organisational levels.  
For the purpose of this paper, we will focus on mobilising the knowledge needed to meet 
project objectives within the organisational boundaries, i.e. the first of a series of key 
knowledge-related activities in PBOs (Lampel et al., 2008). This very first activity includes 
some crucial knowledge management processes, i.e. localising and acquiring, the first two 
knowledge processes in a concept of eight proposed by Probst et al. (2002). According to 
several scholars, the problem of locating internal knowledge on a specialised topic exists 
in any large organisation, and this problem is even harder the larger and more segmented 
the company is (Benbya and Van Alstyne, 2011). Moreover, the internal recruiting of 
knowledge intensive human resources on specific projects may be an awkward issue. 
Hobday (2000) introduces the concept of “internal markets” for good people, where the 
most persuasive and senior PMs tend to monopolize them, sometimes leading to skewed 
performance among projects. Notwithstanding the vast literature on human resource 
management in PBOs (see Huemann et al., 2007 for a review), which deals with many 
knowledge-related aspects (Pemsel et al., 2016; Kelly et al., 2013), and to the knowledge 
of the author, specific contributions on internal knowledge resources (i.e. people) locating 
and acquiring (i.e. recruiting on specific projects) are lacking. 
 
2.2 Internal Knowledge Markets 
Davenport and Prusak (1998) pioneered the concept of a knowledge market within an 
individual firm as a mechanism for enabling knowledge transfer among providers and users 
which requires IT support and incentives. Benbya and van Alstyne (2011, p. 66) define an 
internal knowledge market as: “a forum within an organization that matches knowledge 
seekers with knowledge sources– for example, branch offices and headquarters, novices 
and experts – and that includes material or social incentives to encourage information 
sharing”. Access to intra-firm knowledge is obtained through knowledge-based exchanges 
within internal knowledge markets (Verbeke et al., 2011). Internal knowledge markets 
facilitate transactions among those who own and those who seek knowledge goods. 
Some scholars (Müller et al., 2002) focus on the tradability of knowledge goods on the 
market, and identify two main kinds of knowledge goods that can be traded: digital 
documented knowledge and expert advice. 
Several authors restrict themselves to the exchange on the market of digital documented 
knowledge, i.e. codified knowledge objects in a digitized format (Desouza and Awazu, 
2003; Bryan, 2004; Matson et al., 2003; Hansen and Haas, 2001).  
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Concerning expert advice, Müller et al., (2002) refer to “online expert advice”, i.e. a 
digitally traded service, which is volatile and requires online synchronous interaction 
between expert and seeker.  
Somewhere in between these two types of knowledge goods, we can identify a third kind 
of knowledge good of suggestions, tips, and answers that experts provide in response to 
specific questions, implying asynchronous online interaction. Some authors (Zhang and 
Sundaresan, 2010; Zhang and Jasimuddin, 2012) deal with these kinds of internal “question 
and answer” tools, which are usually regulated by a market mechanism, that recall popular 
online knowledge markets (see e.g. Zhang and Jasimuddin, 2008 on Google Answers).  
Only a few authors take synchronous interactions between seekers and experts a step 
further, towards a sort of internal consulting service or teaming up with the expert (Verbeke 
et al., 2011), which should necessarily take place offline. Verbeke et al., (2011) propose an 
internal market perspective on knowledge sharing, where employees negotiate their 
expertise knowledge with the purpose of leveraging their internal reputation in the firm to 
achieve their own personal goals (Hornung et al., 2008; Rousseau, 2005). Another paper 
(Bryan et al., 2006) focuses on internal markets of expertise knowledge embedded in 
talented people. Bryan et al., (2006) claim that companies should recognize the competitive 
value of their talented internal people and strive to allocate them effectively in order to 
improve their performance, give them better opportunities to utilise and develop that talent 
and, ultimately,  to retain them. According to these authors, companies should set up talent 
markets where top employees can negotiate job transfer, obtain development opportunities 
more easily, build networks and develop intangible assets.  
This paper adds important perspectives to the current literature on knowledge markets, as 
it further develops the concept of internal talent markets, focusing on organisational and 
human resource management dimensions, which technical contributions tend to neglect. In 
addition, it proposes an integrated conceptual framework for internal knowledge markets 
that includes the different kinds of knowledge resources exchanged in a PBO. 
 
3 Conceptual Framework 
 
This section introduces a conceptual framework for an internal knowledge market which 
may suit the context of PBOs. In developing such a framework, we consider the main KM 
issues in PBOs that emerge from the literature review, and we propose a single model that 
integrates the different perspectives and approaches in the literature on knowledge markets. 
Specifically, our contribution lies in an effort to provide a comprehensive framework that 
deals with the main KM issues in PBOs using different market logics, i.e. different 
currencies, incentive structures and organisational support, for the different knowledge 
goods to be traded. Given the strategic importance of tacit knowledge for PBOs and the 
opportunity to adopt a personalisation strategy to manage this knowledge (see 
introduction), we will focus mainly on the internal market for experts, i.e. knowledge-
intensive human resources. By focussing on the internal trade of this strategic knowledge 
good, we aim to address a specific gap in the management literature. In fact, the literature, 
while recognising that managing knowledge-intensive resources is a critical issue in PBOs 
(see e.g. Dubois and Gadde, 2002; Lindkvist, 2004; Whitley, 2006), largely neglects the 
market-based approach to deal with it (see Verbeke et al., 2011 and Bryan et al., 2006 for 
some notable exceptions). 
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To construct a market for knowledge model, we must come back to the nature of knowledge 
goods and their characteristics. As already noted, Müller (2002) introduced a separation 
between goods of a material nature and those that can be traded but have no physical 
substance. The first are digital products, i.e. information that is already stored in a 
completely digital form and can be transferred over communication networks (Luxem, 
2000). These products include documents, manuals, procedures, rules, and links to external 
resources, etc. The second category is “intangible goods”, such as advice, guidance, 
consulting, concepts and know-how. In the area of intangible goods, we introduce a further 
distinction of goods into those can be easily and conveniently made explicit in order to be 
transferred and those that cannot.  To this purpose, the literature uses the term tacit 
knowledge to refer to knowledge that has not been formalised or made explicit (Zander and 
Zander, 1993), as well as to refer to knowledge that cannot be formalised (Popper, 1972; 
Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995; Howells, 1996; Hansen et al., 1999). The first kind includes, 
for example, knowledge that can be easily translated in explicit answers that experts can 
provide online to colleagues (seekers) in order to help them to solve a specific issue, and 
thus potentially saving time and money. The second kind includes tacit knowledge that is 
at best difficult, and at worst impossible, to articulate, as it is highly situated in a context 
and abstracting it from its context of application results in losing much of its intrinsic 
meaning and value (Kakabadse et al., 2001). It is precisely this tacitness that makes this 
knowledge difficult to imitate or import from organisation to organisation and therefore 
makes it an important organisational resource in securing competitive advantage (Grant, 
1996). As we claimed in the introduction, this kind of knowledge is the most relevant kind 
for PBOs and it requires direct interaction between expert and seeker in order to be shared. 
This fact has important implications for the design of a proper knowledge market. We must 
make a further distinction and distinguish between cases in which interaction can 
conveniently occur online, e.g. a Skype conference, and cases that require more time and a 
deeper sharing of ‘mental models’ (Johnson-Laird, 1983) as they are strongly context-
specific and complex. As already noted, this is usually the case in PBOs. It is also worth 
noting that, in the context of knowledge markets, knowledge transfer does not necessarily 
imply knowledge sharing, as the goals of knowledge absorbing and learning are not 
paramount concerns. In this case, project managers are interested in temporarily acquiring 
talented knowledge resources to complete their project teams, in order to satisfy emerging 
customer needs and seize new opportunities in the market. For all these reasons, knowledge 
transfer through online interaction is usually infeasible, in the context of a PBO using a 
knowledge market.  
In the following, we will analyse two different market models: a market for digital 
knowledge goods and expert advice (as asynchronous answers posted online in response to 
specific questions) and a market for talents (as expert-time or task execution). 
 
3.1 Market for Digital Knowledge Goods and Expert Advice 
Digital knowledge goods and expert advice, once made explicit as answers to specific 
questions, can be transferred online and stored in databases for further use. The difference 
between them lies in their creation: digital goods are already stored in digital form and are 
ready to be transferred, whereas expert advice is expressed in words and written as answers 
on demand. Thus, the second requires expert-time to be prepared, at least in its first 
instance. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that providing online digital knowledge goods 
also requires time to search for and possibly customise answers, perhaps removing sensitive 
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
    
 
 
   
   7    
   
 
   
       
 
data. Since both activities require expert-time to be provided, and since expert-time is a 
scarce resource, we argue that they are “economic goods” until such a time that they are 
stored in a database for further use, thus becoming fully-fledged “public goods”. In fact, 
according to definition (Robbins, 1935), a good is “economic” when it is scarce and has 
alternative uses. This definition applies perfectly to the expert-time needed for reading and 
understanding the request, searching for the digital knowledge goods to satisfy it and 
possibly customising them, or preparing a proper answer, and, finally, posting them on the 
platform. On the contrary, once these knowledge resources are available to everyone, stored 
in databases, and the seeker is entirely charged for the cost of finding and customizing 
them, they become public goods, for which markets have proven to be a failing solution 
(see e.g. Kogut and Zander, 1993).  
If we agree that knowledge goods and expert advice can be treated as economic goods the 
very first time they are provided, we know that their value can be easily and conveniently 
expressed by a price that represents the meeting point between supply and demand. In order 
to design a proper market for these kinds of knowledge goods in PBO, we must separate 
the individual level from the project level. In fact, while tacit knowledge translated in digital 
objects belongs to individual experts, expert-time belongs, to some extent, to the project 
manager that is in charge of using it for the project’s success. Thus, we can imagine two 
separate mechanisms working at individual and project levels. At the individual level, 
recognition and reputation deriving from a positive scoring of contributions can be 
powerful drivers for experts, yet at the project level a price-based mechanism is preferable. 
In fact, the costs, in terms of expert-time investment, and the advantages, in terms of 
problem solving support, of knowledge transfer have an impact mainly at the project level.  
Market price represents the correct value of a knowledge resource, which takes several 
aspects into consideration, including its strategic worth for the business, its scarcity (or 
even uniqueness), its current allocation, the demand for it, and so on. Market price not only 
guarantees a fair exchange between the parties but it also gives objective value measures to 
knowledge goods. Localising strategic knowledge resources in the company, following 
their paths in projects (who buys what and from whom), and being able to measure their 
value in a rather objective way are fundamental achievements, which must influence 
company strategy in various respects, first of all in human resource and knowledge 
management. However, designing a pricing system for this kind of knowledge resources is 
not an easy task. In fact, when it comes to the intra-company transfer of digital goods, a 
money exchange is hardly imaginable (e.g. for accounting reasons), although it cannot be 
excluded. Nonetheless, it is important to plan material rewards, which can include frequent 
flyer points or some type of virtual currencies, and it is mandatory is to let prices float 
(Benbya and Van Alstyne, 2011). Indeed, price theory tells us that efficiency requires prices 
to float (Hirshleifer et al., 2005). 
As already stated, at the individual level, social rewards, such as recognition, peer rankings 
and professional identity (Boudreau and Lakhani, 2009), usually work. Of course, motives 
vary by individual, and incentives must be culturally appropriate. In this paper, we imagine 
a voting mechanism that could positively or negatively influence expert reputation. 
Importantly, the voting mechanism must be properly designed, as it may lend itself to 
manipulation and misuse.  Moreover, experts can spend the reputation gained in this 
market, including within the market for talents (detailed in the following section).   
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3.2 Market for Talents 
Since expert-time is a limited resource that has alternative uses, it must be allocated and is 
therefore suitable for exchange through a traditional market mechanism. Thus, we imagine 
a market for expert-time in the context of PBO whereby project managers trade time slots 
of “their” experts, i.e. knowledge-intensive human resources currently allocated on specific 
projects. In fact, what usually happens in PBOs is that experts, even if they are not best 
allocated (or not full-time best allocated), risk remaining stuck within a project border for 
several reasons, including scarce visibility and a misleading concept of “property” that 
some managers develop over human resources. Sometimes, a project manager simply does 
not want to lend a valuable resource to a colleague in exchange for nothing. Thus, prices, 
as already observed in discussing digital knowledge goods, seem to be the best way to 
guarantee fair transactions and give fair value to a knowledge resource, in this case 
represented by expert-time. Moreover, charging the cost of an internal expert on a project 
budget is not such an awkward issue in a PBO. However, it is worth noting that the internal 
transfer of money from a project budget to another has nothing to do with the expert wage. 
In fact, as some scholars observe, the objective of a business is to maximise profits per 
worker rather than wages per worker (Bryan et al., 2006). If the internal market for experts 
allows for improved allocation in terms of value per hour and, especially, in seizing new 
market opportunities and expanding business, then it is clear that it also pursues the 
objective of maximising profits per worker.  
As already noted in the previous section, recognition and reputation are powerful 
motivational drivers at the individual level, provided that the company implement synergic 
organisational and managerial policies. In fact, internal knowledge markets can bring 
evident advantages to companies that succeed in building them, yet, on the other hand, they 
require commitment and specific investments, which we will briefly discuss in the next 
section. 
 
3.3 Organizational and Managerial Issues in Internal Knowledge Market 
As noted in the previous sections, differences exist in how motivation systems and 
currencies act in markets and for agents. Basically, reputation works as a motivational 
driver for experts in both markets while a traditional pricing system regulates negotiations 
among project units. The price of knowledge resources is a fundamental piece of 
information that only a market system can provide, as it is a measure of its strategic value 
for business, its relative scarcity, or, otherwise, its obsolescence or marginality. This 
information should serve as input for the human resource department, which should then 
translate it into proper rewarding actions for the most important strategic human assets of 
the company in order to retain them. In fact, we think that, even though reputation is largely 
recognized as a powerful motivation driver, it should not be left alone. In this respect, it is 
worth noting that money’s traditional role as the dominant motivator is currently under 
debate. Numerous studies (Gibbons, 2006) have concluded that for people with satisfactory 
salaries, some nonfinancial motivators are more effective than extra income in building 
long-term employee engagement in most sectors, job functions, and business contexts. 
Specifically, a McKinsey Quarterly survey (Dewhurst et al., 2009) finds that three non-
cash motivators — praise from immediate managers, leadership attention, and a chance to 
lead projects or task forces — as no less or even more effective motivators than the three 
highest-rated financial incentives: cash bonuses, increased base pay, and stock or stock 
options. 
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Moreover, high prices for specific knowledge resources or even the evidence of the 
impossibility to find them within the company in the face of a significant demand, denounce 
the lack of such resources inside the company and should influence consequent recruiting 
and/or training programs. In a similar way, excessively low prices or the lack of demand 
for specific competences or professional profiles may indicate that they are no longer 
strategic for the company’s business and may need professional updating or outplacement. 
It should be evident that these internal knowledge markets are potentially powerful 
organisational tools, which require a strong commitment by top management, as well as the 
full support of project managers and a widespread culture of knowledge sharing. 
Companies should make specific investments to assure proper rewarding at the individual 
and project unit levels, and it should not be strictly, or at least not only, financial in nature. 
In addition, it is essential that companies allocate a specific budget of time for each person 
to be spent on the platform posting questions, answering colleague requests and updating 
profiles, among other activities.  
4 Conclusions 
This paper introduces a knowledge management system based on market mechanisms in 
the PBO context.  
The originality of the paper lies in assuming different motivational drivers, currencies and 
market structures for the different kinds of knowledge goods that can be exchanged in a 
complex organisational structure, such as a large PBO. We also briefly discuss some 
organisational and managerial issues potentially connected to internal knowledge market 
development.  
Future research will explore the concept of internal knowledge market by means of in-depth 
case studies in some PBOs. The idea is to analyse how they currently manage their strategic 
knowledge resources, by means of which kinds of internal markets (not necessarily clear 
and codified), and to explore the feasibility of the proposed conceptual framework in 
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